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Manual formal software verification is an expensive and time-consuming process. 
Military software is currently verified manually by highly skilled analysts. To reduce the 
high costs of the formal verification, DARPA started a Crowd-Sourced Formal 
Verification (CSFV) program that aims to include as many people as possible to 
participate in this verification process by embedding some of the verification logics into 
computer games. In this study we built a network prototype for hosting a CSFV server on 
a DoD network. 
The CSFV network prototype is designed according to the common security 
practices, necessary security measures against possible attacks, and the Security 
Technical Implementation Guides (STIGs) published by DISA to provide confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Important details are presented about server operating system 
selections, proper usage of necessary network services, and firewall and IDS rules for 
efficient network security. Results from common network penetration test tools confirm 
that our prototype meets the necessary security requirements and can be trusted on a DoD 
network. 
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In 2014 cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are expected to increase 
significantly and consequently cause security expenditures to reach a peak of $86 billion 
(Rivera, 2013). Even after all the attention devoted to this threat, cyber-related problems 
do not seem to be resolved. According to the task force report of the Defense Science 
Board, the advanced cyber threat the Department of Defense (DoD) faces is too 
prevalent, and critical IT structures may stop functioning in case of a sophisticated and 
well-resourced attack vector (Kaminski, 2012). This threat becomes even more disturbing 
when we realize that a malicious user can cripple the Unified Threat Management System 
(10 million lines of code) with a malware (125 lines of code) (Dean, 2013). 
Being under the cyber threat of its opponents, the DoD has taken the necessary 
precautions in different areas. One of those areas is the formal verification of military 
software, which is used to process classified information. One to five bugs are found in a 
thousand lines of code of military software, and most of them are related to security 
vulnerabilities.  
Currently formal verification is performed manually by very specialized engineers 
and this is a very expensive process (Dean, 2013). The Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated a project to lower the costs of the verification 
process and increase the efficiency levels by harnessing the power of a crowd. Crowd 
Sourced Formal Verification (CSFV) aims to perform the necessary software verification 
by creating computer games, which are fun to play. The goal is to make the crowd play 
the games and have the military software verified in the background. Even though it 
sounds innovative to use the crowd to solve a problem, it is not a new concept. 
Crowdsourcing was used by DARPA before to design a next-generation combat vehicle 
and to reconstruct shredded documents, such as those found after military engagements 
(Montalbano, 2011). 
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DARPA plans to run its CSFV systems on the Internet‒‒possibly using cloud 
infrastructure (Dean, 2013). By using Amazon Compute Cloud (EC2) systems, DARPA 
will use ordinary people and make them play the games, which will enable the software 
verification with the help of complex algorithms.  
This thesis aims to design and prototype a secure network for CSFV systems, and 
this network will be run on a limited access intranet such as the Defense Research and 
Engineering Network (DREN), whereas DARPA’s initial gaming environment will exist 
on the Internet, open to everyone.  
B. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1. Problem Statement 
DARPA’s CSFV systems are designed to reside on the Internet, and they 
welcome anyone to log on and play the games. However, there is currently no network 
architecture to run the games on classified intranets such as DREN, the Non-classified 
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) or the Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPRNET). 
2. Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this thesis will be to design and prototype a secure network 
architecture for implementing Crowd Sourced Formal Verification methods on 
classified/unclassified networks. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
In this thesis these research questions will be answered and explained: 
1. What are the common security threats and solutions for securing enterprise 
network resources? 
2. What are the key benefits of virtualization, and how can virtualization be 
implemented on DREN while meeting security requirements? 
3. What are the possible security concerns of cloud computing? 
4. What are the unique security challenges for deploying CSFV on DREN? 
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D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I: “Introduction” (Introductory information about formal verification 
issues and the need for efficient software verification)  
Chapter II: “Background” (Review of definitions and details of concepts related 
to CSFV such as crowdsourcing, cloud computing, virtualization and enterprise network 
security)  
Chapter III: “Network Design” (Design of optimally most secure network in 
regard to the potential security vulnerabilities/threats specifically for CSFV networks) 
Chapter IV: “Implementation” (Creation of the CSFV network prototype) 













This chapter will summarize the core concepts that will be reviewed in this thesis. 
In the following section basic information about crowdsourcing will be presented, 
including its history, current use, and vast benefits. Sections C and D will explain two 
necessary platforms for CSFV systems, which are virtualization and cloud-computing. 
Finally this chapter concludes with information about the current cyber security threats 
pertaining to CSFV networks. 
B. CROWDSOURCING 
Crowdsourcing provides a workspace to be used for a large scale of activities. 
These activities vary from journalism to image indexing and from language translation to 
entertainment (Howe, 2009). Crowdsourcing is the outcome of two words: “crowd” and 
“outsourcing” and is meant to accomplish something with the help of untrained, ordinary 
people, rather than professionals and experienced employees. The crowd may be drawn 
from either a large or small population. The activity, which is done by the crowd may 
help for projects such as designing a task, developing a technology, solving an algorithm 
or classifying, collecting or analyzing large amounts of data (Bell, 2010). Nowadays 
typical examples of crowdsourcing are created online, but the first examples of 
crowdsourcing were quite different. Organizations have leveraged crowdsourcing 
solutions throughout history. 
1. A Brief History of Crowdsourcing 
The history of crowdsourcing dates back to 1714 when the Longitude Contest was 
organized by the English government. The purpose of this contest was to enable the 
government to find a prototype of a navigation device, which might even be developed 
by a common citizen, to help sailors navigate easily (Lynch, 2010). Another early 
example is the Toyota Logo Contest in 1936.  Twenty-seven thousand people attended 
this event, and the best design created by someone in this crowd was chosen to be the 
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Toyota Logo. In 1955 the Sydney Opera House was also designed and built as a result of 
a public contest, which encouraged ordinary people from 32 countries to help this design 
project (Lynch, 2010). 
2. Current Crowdsourcing Activities 
Crowdsourcing provides opportunities to solve the chronic problems worldwide 
that have been waiting to be solved for years. The diverse base of knowledge and abilities 
is unlimited in a crowd. The technique of crowdsourcing would match this diverse base 
with the needs of people using this technique (Howe, 2009). Currently crowdsourcing 
activities around the world are increasing rapidly. Most IT companies are handing their 
technical support elements to forums in which users share knowledge. In journalism, 
sector leaders like Reuters and the BBC are increasingly choosing public resources to 
crowdsource important work, such as investigating government wrongdoings or reports 
about local events. In March 2009 public opinion was largely gathered and analyzed 
through the White House website, and those results greatly affected political  
decisions (Howe, 2009). 
Another area of crowdsourcing is the freelance sector. Although it is a local 
Chinese firm, the freelancing website Zhubajie.com has more than seven million 
subscribers, and it is still growing (Lynch, 2012). Such growth is hardly surprising. It is a 
fact that a large population helps a lot in crowdsourcing. In the following subsections 
some globally known crowdsourcing examples will be presented along with some local 
examples. 
3. Linux Kernel 
Open source software development projects inherently allow users to see, change 
or add code freely to the already developed software. In the 1990s this open source 
development environment enabled the creation of an important product, Linux. Its 
creator, Linus Torvalds, declared that the operating system that he had developed was 
open to any critics, and he was looking for others who could help improve it (Howe, 
2009). By getting the crowd’s help, today Linux is in use everywhere—from 
supercomputers to hand-held devices. 
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4. reCAPTCHA 
Originated at Carnegie Mellon University by Professor Luis Von Ahn, 
reCAPTHCA is designed to digitize the text in the books. It has been used to digitize The 
New York Times archives. Another use of reCAPTCHA is to protect websites from bots 
that are designed to infiltrate the restricted areas in the network (Bell, 2010). 
reCAPTCHA provides websites with the images of words that bot software is 
unable to read. The registered websites help verify these images and present them as 
CAPTCHA words, and the words are sent to digitization projects. This service is 
calculated to provide 12,000 man-hours per day of free labor (Bell, 2010). Popular 
websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Ticketmaster are effectively using this service in 
the customer validation process (Bell, 2010). 
5. Games with a Purpose (GWAP) Project 
Another application in the vast area of crowdsourcing is using simple games to 
achieve a purpose that is much more valuable than just relaxing. Because billions of 
people including children are interested in games, and maybe millions of them are 
spending several hours daily playing games, scientists thought that these valuable hours 
could be used beneficially in parallel with the fun part. Carnegie Mellon University 
Professor Luis Von Ahn created the GWAP project to use game playing hours for a 
scientifically valuable purpose, such as Internet image indexing, monitoring security 
cameras and performing language translation (Ahn, 2006). Other possible application 
areas could be IT security, Internet accessibility, adult content filtering, and web search 
(Ahn, 2006). The main idea behind this project is to have people play games and use the 
results of the games for another purpose. One of the most popular of these games, the 
ESP game designed by Ahn, is designed for two players. These players must agree on the 
best word that represents the image presented to them. They do this without knowing that 
they are seeing the same image (Bell, 2010). 
The concept of playing games is applied to other areas as well. A game such as 
“Foldit,” which was designed by researchers from the University of Washington, allows 
users to play with protein-like structures by folding and unfolding them. When the 
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protein structure is modified games scores are automatically recorded with regard to the 
success level of how accurate the folding is (Bell, 2010). 
6. Verification Games: Making Verification Fun 
This project is directly related to the CSFV concept, and it aims to make people 
play games as a part of the CSFV project. Ernst (2012) investigated ways to lower the 
costs of software verification by developing game-playing-based verification systems. In 
his latest work he introduces and explains the technique he used in the game “Pipe Jam,” 
which is used to map a software and to correct potential problems in that software.  
His game is comprised of boards, levels and worlds in which the gamer plays with 
pipes that are linked to each other. The gamer tries to pass a ball into different sizes of 
pipes. The width of a pipe represents the type of variable that the pipe represents. A wide 
pipe stands for a variable that is permitted to contain a “null” value whereas a narrow 
pipe represents a variable that is guaranteed to be non-null. 
As with the general concept of CSFV, a gamer does not have to know anything 
about the software he helps to verify. Gamers do not have to have confidentiality 
privileges, and they can be anyone from public. 
The Pipe Jam game is analogous to the dataflow network for a program. It maps 
the source code’s type flow properties into a network of pipes. Essentially, this system 
converts the software into a game that can be played by ordinary people. After the player 
finishes a portion of the game the final board configurations can be translated into a proof 
of correctness for the original program (Ernst, 2012). 
a. Amazon Mechanical Turk 
Amazon Mechanical Turk is a platform where organizations find 
employees for their projects. Amazon Web Services provide this platform to match the 
job requesters with the potential workers who can be anywhere around the world. Job 
requesters post the jobs to be done on the Amazon Mechanical Turk web page and let the 




Another example of Internet supported crowdsourcing, SETI@home was 
founded in 1999 and aims to use the computing power of the computers in a crowd to 
find any proof of extraterrestrial life. Scientists managing SETI@home regard the project 
supported by the crowd more important than their supercomputers because of the 
computing power within the crowd (Howe, 2009). 
C. VIRTUALIZATION 
Obviously crowdsourcing and virtualization are different academic disciplines, 
and it can be a little puzzling for the reader to jump directly from crowdsourcing to 
virtualization. However because of this thesis’ interdisciplinary nature these two areas of 
study need to be explicitly stated here. 
Virtualization is the abstraction of computing resources such as processing power, 
storage and network bandwidth. It helps simulate software or hardware and creates a 
simulated environment, which is known as virtual machine (Scarfone, Souppaya and 
Hoffman, 2011). Virtualized environments can have one or more of these goals: 
• To allow any device connected to a network to access any network-
enabled application, even if the device and the application were not 
designed to work compatibly. 
• To isolate two or more applications to provide security or to maintain 
network resources. 
• To isolate an application from the operating system to work with any other 
version of the operating system. 
• To increase the number of users an application can be used for support by 
running the application on different instances of the operating system. 
• To optimize the usage of a system by decreasing the time system resources 
remain idle. 
• To increase system availability via redundancy by guiding the user to a 
running system if the previous system fails (Kusnetzky, 2011). 
After a brief introduction to virtualization and its use for data centers, an overview 
of the types of virtualization to be used throughout the CSFV project will be provided in 
this section.  
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1. Virtual Machine Monitors (VMM) 
VMM is a piece of software that gives the abstraction between machine hardware 
and the virtual machine. VMM records every activity happening within the limits of the 
virtual machine. It provides resources when necessary, and it can also forbid the usage of 
resources. 
2. VMM Types 
To virtualize an operating system, all instructions should be executed by 
hardware, software or a combination of both. These combinations have formed different 
VMM models. The models presented in this thesis will be Type I and Type II VMM 
models. 
a. Type I VMM 
This type runs directly on the machine hardware; that is why this type of 
VMM is called “bare metal.” A Type I VMM would most likely be an operating system 
or kernel that can support virtual machines (Figure 1). It would perform scheduling and 
resource allocation for each virtual machine on the system. Processors should be in 
compliance with every virtualization requirement that is needed by Type I. This 
compliance should provide the necessary protection for the real system from virtual 













Figure 1.  Type I and type II VMM (From Thomas, 2013) 
b. Type II VMM 
This type of VMM runs on a host operating system and is limited to the 
operating system resources, such as memory management, processor scheduling, resource 
allocation and hardware drivers (Figure 1). Because of these dependencies any operating 
system-related security issue might affect the stability of the Type II VMM (DoD ESX 
Server Guide, 2008). 
3. Security Considerations in Virtualization 
The overall security of a virtualization solution is dependent on the security level 
of each of the components. These components could be the hypervisor, host computer, 
host operating system (OS), guest OSs, applications on the system and storage. 
Virtualization users should be sure about the security levels of these elements by taking 
appropriate measures such as controlling access to administrator privileges, having up-to-
date software, performing monitoring and analysis of logs, using anti-malware software, 
using host-based firewalls and any other mechanism to prevent possible attacks. 
Having these security measures for virtualization may not suffice to secure a 
system, however, because the virtualization needs of organizations change in every 
situation, and each situation requires different security approaches. Here, we will dig 
deeper into these security approaches to clarify this concept and explain more about 
hypervisor security. 
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a. Hypervisor Security 
The hypervisor known as Virtual Machine Monitor needs to be secured 
using methods similar to those used to protect other software. The overall security of the 
virtualized system is directly linked to the virtualized management system. Such systems 
should be under absolute control of the administrators. For example when the 
administrator needs to connect to the virtualized system, remote access to administration 
interfaces should be restricted by a firewall. If the communication is carried by an 
untrusted network, data should be under encryption using Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) approved methods (Scarfone, Souppaya and Hoffman, 2011). 
Access should be limited to the hypervisor, especially if it is a bare-metal 
type hypervisor. Although most of the bare-metal hypervisor access methods are based 
on user name and password, some of them still offer additional methods that grant access 
to the hypervisor management interface. 
Unlike bare-metal hypervisors, hosted virtualization environments do not 
generally have access controls. Because of this lack of security measures, anyone who 
can install an application on the OS can manipulate the hypervisor. This vulnerability 
necessitates the policies for organizations specifying the privilege level of accessing the 
hypervisor. The following guiding rules can help implement the right policy for 
hypervisors. 
• Install all updates for the hypervisor as soon as they are released. 
• Protect network communications via authentication and encryption 
using FIPS 140-2 cryptographic modules. 
• Synchronize the virtualized environment to a trusted time server. 
• Remove all unused hardware connected to a host system. 
• Do not use hypervisor file-sharing systems if they are not needed. 
The file-sharing systems are considered possible attack vectors 
(Scarfone, Souppaya and Hoffman, 2011). 
Additionally, hosted virtualization means that more threats will be around 
the system because the hosting OS will possibly have some vulnerabilities in addition to 
hypervisor security concerns. Unnecessary applications on the host OS should be 
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removed because the security of each guest OS will be affected by the host OS security 
(Scarfone, Souppaya and Hoffman, 2011). 
So far the biggest concern of security personnel is hiding hypervisors from 
the eyes of attackers. However, hypervisors have certain characteristics that make 
attackers aware of their existence. The hypervisor’s interactions with file systems, 
registry and related virtual drives all give some information to potential attackers. To 
prevent such attacks against a hypervisor using virtualized systems, organizations should 
take into consideration the risks and vulnerabilities (Scarfone, Souppaya and Hoffman, 
2011). 
D. CLOUD COMPUTING 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Definition of Cloud Computing (Mell and Grance, 2009), cloud computing is a robust and 
dependable pool of network resources, which includes computing, storage, applications 
and databases. One of the most important characteristics of this pool is its rapidly 
releasable and on-demand nature. This system would require the least management effort 
and less service provider interaction (Mell and Grace, 2009). A graphic representation of 
the NIST cloud computing model is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  NIST visual model of cloud computing (From Damiani, 2011) 
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1. Characteristics of Cloud Computing 
According to the NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, characteristics of this 
computing include on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid 
elasticity and measured service. These characteristics make cloud computing more 
beneficial in terms of efficiency and innovation in comparison to the current computing 




Cloud Benefits Current Environment 
• Improved asset utilization 
(server utilization > 60‐ 70%) 
• Aggregated demand and 
accelerated system consolidation 
(e.g., Federal Data Center 
Consolidation initiative) 
• Improved productivity in 
application development, 
application management, 
network, and end‐user devices 
• Low asset utilization (server 
utilization < 30% typical) 
• Fragmented demand and 
duplicative systems 
• Difficult to manage systems 
Cloud Benefits Current Environment 
• Shift focus from asset 
ownership to service 
management 
• Tap into private sector 
innovation 
• Encourage entrepreneurial 
culture 
• Improve link to emerging 
technologies (e.g., devices) 
• Burdened by asset 
management 
• De-coupled from private sector 
innovation engines 
• Risk-averse culture 
Table 1.   Cloud benefits: efficiency and innovation (From Takai, 2012) 
Several cloud computing benefits are detailed in the following paragraphs. 
On-demand self-service: The user can alter unilaterally the system capabilities 
such as computing, server and storage settings, if needed, and there is no need for 
interaction with a Cloud Service Provider (CSP). 
Broad Network Access: Cloud capabilities are available for a wide variety of 
thick and thin clients through standard access methods. Those clients could be mobile 
phones, laptops, netbooks, tablet computers or personal digital assistants (PDAs) (Smoot 
and Tan, 2012). 
Resource pooling: End-user needs are the main factor that dynamically assigns 
and reassigns the computing sources of the CSP. Those resources could include storage, 
processing power, memory, network bandwidth and virtual machines. The CSP has 
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relative freedom in notifying the end-user of the actual physical locations of provided 
resources. End-users are thought to be able to access these resources through an intranet 
if they are internal users and through the Internet if they are outsiders (Smoot and Tan, 
2012). 
Rapid Elasticity: The CSP can quickly change the system capabilities to both 
scale in and out according to the user needs. End-users mostly think that system 
capabilities to provision are unlimited and usable (Mell and Grance, 2009). 
Measured Service: Cloud computing capabilities are under the control and 
surveillance of the CSP, with the help of a measuring system that often operates on a pay-
per-use basis. This system provides transparency of used service (storage, computing, 
bandwidth) for both the cloud provider and the end-user  (Mell and Grance, 2009). 
2. Cloud Computing Deployment Models 
There are four deployment models of cloud computing: 
Public Cloud: This type of cloud is available to almost anyone in the crowd who 
can access the Internet. With the development of cloud technologies, service providers 
operating in this area are increased. Some widely known examples include Amazon’s 
Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Rackspace’s Cloud Offerings, and IBM’s BlueCloud 
(Winkler, 2011). While these providers primarily offer Infrastructure service, there are 
others that give Application layer service, such as Google’s AppEngine and Windows’ 
Azure Services platform. 
From a security perspective public clouds can be considered both secure and 
unsecure. They are considered secure because public clouds are mainly operated by large 
scale CSPs. Therefore they should have enough security measures, including access 
control, data ownership and encryption (Winkler, 2011). On the other hand, end-users 
leave their data in the hands of the provider not knowing whether it is secure or not. CSPs 
have no obligation to their customers regarding the location of the stored data. If data is 
stored offshore in another country, the data is expected to be subject to the laws of the 
hosting country (Winkler, 2011). 
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Private Clouds: Private clouds are hosted internally and basically serve only one 
organization. Unlike data on public clouds, data on private clouds are not mixed with 
external users’ data. However, organizations may want to provide data isolation to satisfy 
the needs of the organization’s own subunits (Winkler, 2011). Private clouds can be 
owned, maintained and operated by either the organization itself, a third party or a 
combination of both (Mell and Grance, 2009). 
From a security perspective private clouds have more constraints than public 
clouds because small scale organizations may not address the computation needs as do 
large scale CSPs operating public clouds. It would also be incorrect to assume that 
private clouds are more secure than public ones (Winkler, 2011). Considering that private 
clouds use virtualization to save more on computing resources, private cloud providers 
should obtain measures, such as hypervisor and virtual machine security, to secure the 
virtualization environment (Winkler, 2011). The point of operating private clouds is that 
we can address the security issues by ourselves and are free to use any further measures 
that we deem appropriate. We have the chance to implement the security architecture 
according to organizational needs. In this sense a private DoD cloud can employ stricter 
security measures than a private cloud that is owned by a business corporation. 
Community Clouds: The cloud infrastructure is created for the use of multiple 
independent organizations that have the same concerns (that is, security, mission, 
regulation, policy or compliance). The system may be owned and maintained by each of 
the organizations, a third party or a combination of them (Mell and Grance, 2011). This 
model presents a valuable opportunity for the organizational entities that have similar 
legal and compliance restrictions. Different levels of community clouds are being 
considered both by the governments of the United States and the European Union. 
Governments will benefit because inter-government business transactions are considered 
to be processes in a possessed environment and will cause no additional costs as does the 
Internet (Winkler, 2011). 
Hybrid Clouds:  This cloud infrastructure can be a combination of two or more 
different cloud types, as shown in Figure 3. Here separate and different clouds remain as 
a unique entity, and each of them is linked to others via a technology that enables secure 
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data transmission (Mell and Grance, 2011). Hybrid clouds are generally preferred by 
entities that operate private clouds. The main reason for this preference could be either 
security related or financial. An entity such as the DoD can have its confidential data in 
the private cloud and store unclassified data in the public cloud. Here hybrid cloud 
infrastructures will allow the necessary data transfer of the organization (Winkler, 2011). 
 
Figure 3.  Hybrid cloud (From Shilovitsky, 2013) 
E. CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICE MODELS 
Software as a Service (SaaS): The applications running on a CSP’s 
infrastructure are the services provided to the consumer. Those applications could either 
be accessed via thin clients, such as a web browser, or via the interface of software. The 
consumer has no privilege to change any settings of infrastructure, servers, operating 
systems, or storage except for some limited application configurations (Mell and Grance, 
2011). Moreover, consumers may not want to change those settings. Google’s GMAIL or 
Yahoo mail services can be considered examples of SaaS (Winkler, 2011). 
Platform as a Service (PaaS):  The consumer is capable of using his own 
application or an application provided by the CSP, as well as the libraries, services and 
tools (Mell and Grance, 2011). The consumer has control only over the applications he 
uses. He does not and cannot control the infrastructure, operating systems or servers 
provided by the CSP. In this sense, the PaaS is similar to the SaaS model. However, the 
PaaS model is different because the consumer owns the application. Google App Engine 
could be an example of the PaaS model (Winkler, 2011). 
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Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): This service model has the most flexible 
components provided to the consumer. In this model consumers can change applications, 
storage components, operating systems, databases and even some limited networking 
entities such as host firewalls (Mell and Grance, 2011). Some CSPs, including Amazon, 
go further providing services that the consumer can access through a platform of routers, 
switches and data centers (Winkler, 2011). This model is compared to other cloud 
computing models in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Comparison of service models (From Lau, 2011) 
From a security perspective the IaaS model is preferable for an organization like 
the DoD. No matter which cloud type the DoD utilizes, the necessary solution seems to 
be the IaaS model.  
F. ENTERPRISE NETWORK SECURITY 
1. Network Security Concepts 
The term “network security” is derived from “computer security.” According to 
NIST, computer security comprises the necessary protection mechanisms to provide 
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confidentiality, integrity and availability of data being processed (Stallings and Brown, 
2008). These three terms are widely known as the CIA Triad, and they lay out the 
essential principles concerning data and information security. The CIA Triad, shown in 
Figure 6, refers to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. Confidentiality 
avoids the unnecessary disclosure of information to unauthorized parties. Integrity 
protects information so that it cannot be changed in an unauthorized manner. Availability 
makes sure that information is always available for authorized users and keeps the system 
in service (Stallings and Brown, 2008). 
 
Figure 5.  The security triad (From Chou, 2012) 
2. Security Vulnerabilities, Threats and Countermeasures 
As former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted repeatedly, the next Pearl 
Harbor is expected to happen soon, but this time from the cyber domain (Panetta, 2012). 
Current Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel also drew attention to the importance of cyber 
security from a global perspective (Hagel, May 2013). Indeed, providing cyber security is 
firstly a macro level necessity. According to the Advanced Cyber Threat Report cyber 
threats share almost the same importance level as nuclear armament issues (Defense 
Science Board, 2013). In this thesis study we will use an enterprise level approach and 
analyze vulnerabilities, possible threats and necessary cyber countermeasures to mitigate 
the security risks related to cloud computing. 
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a. Security Vulnerabilities 
In the security context, when we refer to security vulnerabilities we mean 
the vulnerabilities of system resources such as computing power and storage. This 
resource could be damaged or changed in such a way that it differs from what it is 
supposed to be. The resource may be leaky, giving information to unauthorized parties. 
Also the resource could be unavailable or very slow, and it may not serve system users as 
expected (Stallings and Brown, 2008). 
Unnecessary open ports: An open port is used for communication 
between computer systems on a network. A designated software works on a single port 
(e.g., Mail service works on port 25 on most computers). When a port is open it 
continuously listens for possible communications intended for it. If the service running 
on the port is unnecessary that port should be closed to decrease the vulnerability level. 
Unpatched systems: System security vulnerabilities exist in almost all 
computer systems and software. They are supposed to be patched by the vendors to avoid 
vulnerabilities because hackers/attackers look for holes in such systems to exploit them 
via malicious codes (Gregory, 2010). Most software vendors react quickly to distribute 
patches to fix the security holes, and system users are expected to apply those patches. 
When necessary patches are not installed on the system, it becomes vulnerable to possible 
threats.  
b. Security Threats 
A security threat is the possibility of an adverse condition affecting 
computer systems. This threat could be realized from outside the enterprise or even from 
within an enterprise by a disgruntled employee (Gregory, 2010).  
Denial of Service (DoS): The DoS prevents or limits the intended use of 
communication infrastructures. An attacker can scale his attack to a limited level such as 
the recording of security audits. Sometimes he aims to take the whole network down by 
disabling it or overloading the network with random messages to downgrade performance 
levels (Stallings and Brown, 2008). 
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A developed form of DoS attack is the Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack, which targets network resources by overwhelming traffic. DDoS attacks 
could originate from thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of systems. Highly 
complicated DDoS attacks use a botnet (see Figure 7), which is a collection of zombie 
computers, controlled by botnet operators (Gregory, 2010). 
 
Figure 6.  Distributed Denial of Service attack (From Masikos et.al., 2004) 
Sequence Number: Sequence number attacks attempt to hijack or fail a 
TCP session between two parties by guessing the sequence number of any of the TCP 
packets and achieving a correct timing. The attacker then sends false packets to either one 
of the parties pretending to be a valid sender.  
Smurf: A smurf attack includes a large number of fake Internet Contol 
Message Protocol (ICMP) echo requests. The ICMP packets are sent to the broadcasting 
address of the target network, causing all the devices to respond with ICMP packets as 
well. The attacker changes the “from” part of the packets to the target system’s IP 
address. When all of the devices send replies to the echo request the target system gets 
overloaded (Gregory, 2010). 
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Spam: Spam attacks comprise a high volume of emails which mostly have 
commercial origins. Spam on the Internet is estimated to account for 90% of all email 
communication. Spam aims to degrade the performance of network devices by evading 
frequently used spam filters (Gregory, 2010). 
Phishing: Phishing is a type of spam, and it is performed by sending mails 
while masquerading as official parties such as banks, hospitals or government agencies. 
After defrauding the mail recipients, the attacker gathers some important personal 
information like credit card or social security numbers (Gregory, 2010). 
SQL (Structured Query Language) Injection: SQL injection attacks are 
one of the most significant threats to websites and databases. This type of attack mainly 
aims to introduce some malicious input, such as SQL codes, to a website and then gather 
confidential or other sensitive information from the linked database. The basic cause of 
SQL injection attacks is insufficient input validation measures (Halfond and Orso, 2005). 
This type of attack succeeds when input from a website visitor is accepted as a database 
SQL query without being validated. The attacker then becomes able to perform his SQL 
query embedded in the input for the website. In this way the intruder can gather, modify 
and delete data in the database. Clearly it is a threat for all three domains of information 
security (i.e., confidentiality, integrity and availability). In our proposed CSFV project to 
be run on DREN, the CSFV website could be vulnerable to this kind of attack because of 
the nature of its web-based applications. 
Cross Site Scripting (XSS): An XSS threat resembles the previous threat 
of SQL injection in the way that a website lacks security measures to check the input 
coming from users. XSS targets the website as content defacement or DDoS attacks, 
whereas SQL injection aims to manipulate the database behind the website (Ernst, 2009). 
According to past research XSS attacks moved to the top of the cyber threat assessment 
in documents such as “SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors” and Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) lists, passing the famous buffer overflow attacks. 
Basically XSS attacks use special characters when giving input to Hyper Text Mark-up 
Language (HTML) documents such as adding <script> to inputs to invoke the 
JavaScripts interpreter. When the browser does not perform input validation, the attacker 
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becomes successful and finds ways to further exploit the website such as account 
hijacking, cookie poisoning and even Denial of Service (Shar and Tan, 2012). 
c. Security Countermeasures 
Encryption composes the essential part of network security and security 
countermeasures. It includes two main pieces of information security: Symmetric Key 
Encryption and Asymmetric Key Encryption. In short, symmetric encryption means 
having a single key for each cryptographic algorithm, whereas asymmetric encryption 
uses two different keys, one of which would be known by public (Diffie and Helman, 
1976). The other key is supposed to be kept secret by its owner and would be used to 
decrypt the messages that were previously encrypted by the other public key. Key 
distribution in symmetric encryption is known to be easy because there is only a single 
key to be controlled by two users. Although key distribution is more difficult in 
asymmetric ciphers, it is more secure. The common feature of both symmetric and 
asymmetric ciphers is that the algorithm would be known by everyone, but the key is 
supposed to be known just by owner as explained in Kerckhoffs’s principle (Kerckhoffs, 
1883). 
The network security concept also includes practical applications such as 
IPsec technology, firewalls and authentication (Tanenbaum, 2003). Some of these 
applications will be used as system security measures in the experimentation sections of 
this thesis. 
IPsec (IP Security): Being originally a communications security measure, 
IPsec was created to fill the security gap throughout Internet. The argument at the first 
point was to provide data security either end-to-end fashion or just on the network with 
unaware users. After long discussions among security experts a security model emerged, 
and it was designed to provide network level security (Tanenbaum, 2003). IPsec has two 
modes of operation, which are transport mode and tunnel mode. The advantage of tunnel 
mode is that it adds another IP layer onto the packet, making data transfer easier and 
concealing flow of data in a better way. 
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Firewalls: The need for firewalls emerged after fast improvement of 
networks by means of connectivity and speed. Especially when networks overcame the 
size of premises and started forming Wide Area Networks (WAN) with the need for 
better connectivity, network input-output controls became more important. Then firewalls 
started to be used (Stallings, 2008). Essentially a firewall is composed of two routers 
working as packet filters and an application gateway. The point here is to force all of the 
traffic–‒incoming and outgoing‒–to use the route through the firewall. This way the 
firewall will allow or prohibit certain IP packets depending on whether the packets are 
authorized or not. This allow-or-prohibit decision is made by using IP numbers and port 
numbers. For instance, firewalls should prohibit data traffic coming to port 23, which is a 
telnet port (Tanenbaum, 2003). 
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS): An IPS is a network-based 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with an additional capability of dropping packets and 
blocking traffic as well as detecting malicious traffic and sounding alarms. IPSs can 
either be in a form of host based or network based (Stallings, 2008). 
A host-based IPS can check packets depending on their signatures or by 
using heuristics. Signature checking is controlling the payloads coming with the packets. 
The drop or allow decision is made depending on the presence of malicious content. 
When heuristics are used, the IPS looks for anomalies and misbehaviors of packets which 
can be either a modification of system resources, privilege-escalation exploits, buffer-
overflow exploits or access to email contact lists (Stallings, 2008). 
A network-based IPS is an inline device that has the capability of 
inspecting Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packets by tearing them down. It applies 
this inspection on every incoming data flow, and when a malicious behavior is seen, all 
the future data packets pertaining to that data flow are dropped. Some of the techniques 
used by network-based IPS systems to find malicious packets are pattern matching, 
stateful matching and protocol anomaly (Stallings, 2008). An example of network-based 
IPS is SNORT, which is an open-source, network-based, intrusion prevention system. It 
can employ signature-based, protocol-based and anomaly-based inspection. 
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III. NETWORK DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter a secure CSFV network design will be discussed, key network 
design questions will be asked, potential security vulnerabilities and threats specifically 
relevant to CSFV networks will be presented and the necessary network components for 
optimal system security will be explained. 
Before examining the network design, it is important to understand the following 
facts about the surrounding environment: 
• The games and the database infrastructure are not yet released at the time 
this chapter is being written, so the design principles in this document will 
refer to presentations, drafts or other kinds of documents related to CSFV 
studies of CSFV vendors or DARPA. 
• The network infrastructure will be focused on security design, which does 
not mean that performance factors of the network are totally ignored; 
rather they will be discussed optimally with a security emphasis. 
• This system will first be deployed on the NPS Intranet and then transferred 
to DREN. Design decisions will be made according to Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) Security Technical Implementation 
Guides (STIG).   
• The necessary security measures such as the location of firewalls, usage of 
IPS or IDS, network segmentation for better security and specific services 
(reverse proxy) will be discussed in this chapter. More detailed design 
parameters such as operating systems, firewall-IDS rules, and 
virtualization technologies to be used in the CSFV network will be 
presented in Chapter 4. 
B. NETWORK DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES 
Several network design publications were used as guidelines while creating the 
CSFV network. The first of those publications is written by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology: NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-44, Guidelines on 
Securing Public Web Servers, explains how to operate public-facing web servers for 
organizations such as the DoD and the private sector. It presents general 
recommendations about web servers, including operating system (OS) choice, 
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virtualization of OSs and communication security between web servers and database 
servers. 
CSFV networks would run on DREN-owned infrastructure, so the initial design 
principles should be also in compliance with the publications, which set networking rules 
for DREN. Network Infrastructure STIG (2007) and Web Server STIG (2006) are two 
publications that we used to build our network. According to these documents an 
optimum level of network security should be provided by the following security 
measures: 
• DoD networks should be layered according to the information security 
levels that those layers contain. 
• The security in-depth principle should be used in locating the network 
components. 
• DoD system administrators should install, maintain and operate IDS inside 
their networks with the capability of logging. 
• Firewalls and web proxies should be deployed for perimeter security. 
• Web servers and database servers should reside on separate devices. 
• Web servers should use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer 
Security (TLS). 
C. NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
We had three main goals before starting to design this network: to create a 
topology that shows the physical and logical elements of the network; to secure the 
network components against the most common threats of the day and from ones possible 
in the near future; and to prevent those security measures from degrading the throughput 
of the network. 
There were a couple of issues in mind in the design process: 
• securing the network from both Internet and possible insider attacks, 
• using a multi-layered security approach to secure sensitive and classified 
information such as the database server, 
• having additional systems for logging, encryption and intrusion detection 




Figure 7.  CSFV Network topology. 
To examine the architecture in our network, we focused on the following seven 
questions: 
• Why do we use virtualization technology for game servers and database 
servers? 
• Why are game servers and database servers designed to reside on separate 
physical servers rather than being virtualized on the same machine? 
• Why do we use IDS, not IPS? 
• Why do we use two separate IDSs? 
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• What is the design principle related to using two firewalls, and what are 
their roles? 
• What is our goal in using a reverse proxy? 
• Is encryption necessary in CSFV network design, and how will it 
function? 
D. SEGMENTED DESIGN 
In this section detailed answers will be given to the preceding questions by 
partitioning the network (Figure 7) and explaining it part by part. 
1. Border Router and Firewall 
There will be a router and a firewall at the point where our network connects to 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) website (nps.edu), as shown in Figure 7. The router 
and firewall can be either separate devices, or they could be designed to reside on the 
same physical server as a multi-functional system. The decision on this location will be 
given at the implementation phase.  
When choosing the type of firewall, we had a couple of options. It could be a 
packet filter firewall, which would operate at Layer 3, a stateful inspection firewall 
operating at Layer 4 or a deep packet inspection firewall, which additionally inspects 
application level loads. A packet filter firewall would be a poor choice because this type 
of firewall accepts every packet without looking at the destination port. The third choice, 
a deep packet inspection firewall, would possibly create a choke point at the entrance of 
the network and decrease the throughput. A stateful inspection firewall was the optimal 
solution both for the IP packet inspection security and for the system performance. 
Choosing to use stateful inspection firewalls is also necessary in utilizing the second 
firewall, which comes behind the switch. The application level packet inspection job of 
the two firewalls would be executed by the IDSs. Again, this decision was based on 
system performance concerns, not to mention the high cost of deep packet inspectors or 
the technical difficulty in utilizing them effectively. 
The first firewall will be configured to inspect packets which are coming to the 
reverse proxy server that will be in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), whereas the second 
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firewall looks into the packets coming to the database server. This second firewall only 
allows the packets coming from the address of game servers to database server. In case of 
a compromise of the reverse proxy, the attacker will not be able to access the database 
server because of this second firewall behind the DMZ. 
 
Figure 8.  Firewall design. 
2. IDS 
To further protect the required network additional elements, in this phase we had 
the option of using IPS, IDS or both. When we consider that IPS would inspect a packet 
and sometimes necessarily drop it, we identified this possibility as a drawback for 
network throughput by generating false alarms (i.e., false positives). That is the reason 
we chose to use IDS. IDS will stay on the network and watch the ongoing traffic without 
interfering. It will start an alarm when malicious packets or abnormal network activity are 
detected. IDS will inspect the packets by comparing them to attack signatures or pre-
installed IDS rules (DISA, 2007). The reason we use two separate IDS devices is to 
provide security in depth throughout the network. While the first IDS is inspecting the 
traffic in the DMZ, the second IDS will operate in a more secure part of the network and 




Figure 9.  IDS deployment. 
3. Game Servers and Database Server 
Game servers in the DMZ will be virtualized on the same physical server to 
provide efficient resource utilization. The number of game servers will initially be two, 
and this initial design will test the systems in a simple infrastructure with as few negative 
factors as possible. Furthermore, the CSFV network would eventually be deployed on a 
DoD cloud (Dean, 2013), and a virtualized environment on the NPS network will help us 
find and solve any potential vulnerabilities related to virtualization before this final 
deployment. 
We plan to operate the game servers in a virtualized environment; however, the 
database server will reside on another physical server. The reason for this design is to 
have multiple security layers in the network and to prevent any attacker from gaining 
access to our database server after compromising a game server. It is basically a two-fold 
security measure. Firstly, we avoid a virtualization-related “escape attack,” in which an 
attacker easily jumps to another virtualized system after accessing one virtualized 
environment. Secondly, our design makes an attack more difficult by putting the database 
in the trusted layer of our network. 
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Figure 10.  Database server. 
4. Reverse Proxy Server 
A reverse proxy will be running between the game servers and their clients. It will 
serve as a proxy server operating in the reverse direction. The clients of game servers will 
not know the IP address of the game servers; rather they will know the address of the 
reverse proxy server and communicate with it. Because reverse proxies are specially 
designed systems they are more trusted and secure than regular servers.  
Additional features of reverse proxies are caching and load balancing. Caching 
increases the speed of the network by keeping the most frequently used records-data and 
retrieving them upon request. Load balancing will distribute the traffic of Hyper Text 
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) over the 
two game servers, which will allow us to increase the number of game servers as the 
number of gamers expands. Moreover a load-balanced server will withstand the high 
volume of requests during a possible DoS attack by distributing the workload to many 
servers.  
 
Figure 11.  Reverse proxy server. 
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E. ADDITIONAL SECURITY MEASURES 
1. Encryption 
Data traffic between the reverse proxy server and its clients will be encrypted 
using SSL/TLS. The outcome traffic will be HTTPS which is, in short, an HTTP session 
encrypted with SSL/TLS. The only port that will be open is port 443 (DISA, 2006). 
It is also determined that encrypting only the communication between server 
clients and the reverse proxy server would be enough. Other than that the traffic between 
the game servers and database server will not be encrypted to keep performance levels 
high.  
2. Authentication 
Another fact about SSL/TLS encryption is that it will provide server/client 
authentication by exchanging digital signatures between the reverse proxy server and its 
client. When a gamer wants to access a game site SSL/TLS authentication will occur, and 
the browser of the gamer will handshake with the server via the server’s digital signature. 
This digital signature can be provided in two ways: creating and getting it verified from a 
third party Certificate Authority (CA) or by creating and signing itself (Tracy, 2007). 
Here, the digital signature will not be provided by a third party, it will be created by the 
server itself. 






In the previous chapter we have mentioned facts about the network design and 
topology and explained the design process including the proper locations of network 
elements, necessary services to be used by those elements and security concepts to be 
applied to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability. We have also validated the 
deployment of separate subnets and security components according to the necessary 
documents of DISA-DoD. 
In this chapter we will explain how we implemented our system with a slight 
difference from the initial design. We will show the details, such as IP addressing-
subnetting, server operating system selections, proper usage of the necessary network 
services, firewall rules and IDS rules for efficient network security. At the end we will 
perform a network penetration test with popular attack tools.  
We will not discuss the troubles we came across while implementing the firewall 
and IDS rules although there were many, and we spent a considerable amount of time 
troubleshooting them. In particular, Redhat license expirations, conflicts between firewall 






B. GENERAL NETWORK INFORMATION 
1. Network Topology Implementation 
 
 
Figure 12.  Subnets in the CSFV Network. 
Subnetting is necessary in the networks to maintain security. Our network 
elements are distributed through three subnets (Figure 12), which are 172.20.104.0, 
10.0.0.0 and 192.168.0.0. While nps.edu maintains a subnet of 255.255.0.0 for the 
172.20.104.0 network, the author used 255.255.255.0 subnet both for 10.0.0.0 and 
192.168.0.0 networks. The main idea behind having separate subnets is to provide 
security in depth and to have a security-enhanced network architecture. 
After creating the initial design for the CSFV network architecture we decided to 
make some small changes on the first design. The first of those changes is to remove the 
border router and replace it with the reverse proxy.(Figure 13) With this change the 
landing machine of the network becomes the reverse proxy, which also runs a firewall on 
itself. By moving the reverse proxy to a different network than the game servers, we aim 
to avoid a possible attack scenario that can compromise the game servers by estimating 
their IP address range. Because those servers will be on separate networks, the attacker 
will not easily use a network scanner (such as nmap) and get access to the game servers. 
The second change to the initial design is to configure the second IDS as a host-
based IDS, rather than a network-based IDS. With this change our goal is to run the first 
IDS to detect network-based attacks such as man-in-the-middle, packet sniffing and 
network scanning, whereas the second IDS is to be run on a server (database server) and 
detect the attacks, such as DDoS and password attacks. 
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Figure 13.  CSFV network implementation. 
2. Implementation of Servers 
There are a total of four servers, two IDS machines and two firewalls in the CSFV 
network. Each of them is either virtualized on a physical server or not virtualized, 
depending on its usage. For example, the reverse proxy server stays at the entrance of the 
network as a border router and forwards traffic back and forth. Because it also runs a 
firewall on it, we gave it a separate non-virtualized machine. On the other hand, the 





Figure 14.  VMware ESXi vSphere Client. 
We used VMware ESXi as the bare-metal operating system to virtualize the game 
servers and to make the network more efficient. As DISA STIG about VMware ESXi 5 
requests, we installed and maintained the server and database operating systems through 
ESXi shell and the software called vSphere Client (Figure 14).  
In this process the usage of ESXi shell was very helpful because it can be 
managed by connecting through a secure shell (Figure 15). ESXi shell is useful because it 
does not need a direct connection with the ESXi virtualization server. It is enough to have 




Figure 15.  VMware ESXi command shell. 
 
VIRTUALIZED	  SYSTEMS	  ON	  CSFV	  NETWORK	  
VM	  
NAME	  
ROLE	   HOSTNAME	   IP	  ADDRESS	   OPERATING	  SYSTEM	  
ESXi	  1	   WEB	  SERVER	   csfv5	   10.0.0.234	   RED	  HAT	  ENTERPRISE	  
LINUX	  6.4	  
ESXi	  1	   WEB	  SERVER	   csfv6	   10.0.0.235	   RED	  HAT	  ENTERPRISE	  
LINUX	  6.4	  
ESXi	  2	   IDS	  -­‐	  1	   swing	   10.0.0.236	   RED	  HAT	  ENTERPRISE	  
LINUX	  6.4	  
ESXi	  3	   DATABASE	  SERVER	  
and	  IDS-­‐2	  
csfv7	   192.168.0.11	   RED	  HAT	  ENTERPRISE	  
LINUX	  6.4	  
Table 2.   Virtualized systems. 
As it is seen from the Table 2, there are three bare-metal virtualization operating 
systems in the network. ESXi-2 runs the game servers at 10.0.0.0 network, ESXi-1 runs 
the first IDS server at 10.0.0.0 network and ESXi-3 runs the database server and the 
second IDS server at 192.168.0.0 network. 
The non-virtualized systems (Table 3) consist of a reverse proxy server and 
firewall server, which run on the CentOS 6.4 operating system. They use CentOS because 
the first CSFV systems, which would run on Amazon cloud architecture, EC2, would 
have CentOS as a server operating system. CentOS shares the same source code as Red 
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Hat, and the main difference between them is that the necessary update packages are 
publicly open source (Red Hat Enterprise Linux Installation Guide, 2013). 
 
NON-­‐VIRTUALIZED	  SYSTEMS	  ON	  CSFV	  NETWORK	  
ROLE	   HOSTNAME	   IP	  ADDRESS	   OPERATING	  SYSTEM	  
REVERSE	  PROXY	  +	  
FIREWALL	   csfv4	   172.20.104.233	   CENTOS	  6.4	  
FIREWALL-­‐2	   second	  chance	   10.0.0.21	   CENTOS	  6.4	  
Table 3.   Non-virtualized Systems. 
Additionally, we downloaded and installed the necessary software packages from 
Red Hat repository to run the games appropriately. The necessary coordination was done 
with the contactor from TopCoder (CSFV PI Meeting, 2013). In total, 16 packages are 
displayed in this chapter, and they are installed particularly to run the games. The 




collectd.x86_64                          4.10.9-1.el6                         @epel       
epel-release.noarch                      6-8                                  @epel       
gccxml.x86_64  0.9.0-0.12.20120309.el6              @epel      
ius-release.noarch  1.0-11.ius.el6                       @ius        
joe.x86_64  3.7-4.el6                            @epel       
kernel.x86_6 2.6.32-
220.17.1.el6.centos.plus      
@centosplus 
kernel.x86_64  2.6.32-
358.6.1.el6.centos.plus       
@centosplus 
kernel-devel.x86_64  2.6.32-
220.17.1.el6.centos.plus      
@centosplus 
kernel-devel.x86_64  2.6.32-










358.6.1.el6.centos.plus       
@centosplus 
links.x86_64  1:2.2-12.el6                         @epel       
mongo-10gen.x86_64  2.4.3-mongodb_1   @10gen      
mongo-10gen-
server.x86_64  
2.4.3-mongodb_1                      @10gen      
nginx.x86_64  1.4.1-1.el6.ngx                      @nginx      
xmlstarlet.x86_64  1.3.1-1.el6                          @epel       
Table 4.   Necessary packages from CentOS repository 
3. Running Firewall Rules 
The CSFV network uses the Linux IPtables application that is embedded on the 
Red Hat/CentOS operating systems to define firewall rules for the firewall servers. We 
chose to use the Linux IPtables feature because it does not need any additional hardware 
or software, which would incur additional cost; it is a powerful tool used world-wide, and 
it is flexible enough to give the system administrator a wide area of rule options. 
IPtables operates by using the “TABLE” concept, which has “CHAINs”. The two 
main tables are “NAT” and “FILTER.” The NAT table has PREROUTING, 
POSTROUTING and OUTPUT chains. On the other hand, the FILTER table includes 
 42 
INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD chains. IPtables also has the feature of user-defined 
rules. 
Our IPtables rules include two tables. The “NAT” table provides the network with 
Network Address Translation (NAT) to access outside of the network. It is also a tool to 
enhance security and availability of the network. The NAT rules make the servers inside 
our network access the IP range outside of the CSFV network by getting different IP 
addresses.  
The FILTER table does most of the work in the network. It accepts certain IP 
addresses and ports, drops unwanted IP traffic for security or performance reasons and 
logs the IP packets, which were dropped for further inspection. 
Our first firewall (csfv4.ern.nps.edu) has the rules to accept incoming valid 
packets. It is set to allow the incoming traffic to the server’s 22 and 443 ports. 
 
-A INPUT -s 0/0 -i eth0 -d 172.20.104.233  -p TCP --dport 
443 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -s 0/0 -i eth0 -d 172.20.104.233  -p TCP --dport 
22 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -s 172.20.104.233 -o eth0 -d 0/0  -p tcp --sport 
22 -j ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -p tcp -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -
j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 22 -m state --state 




Csfv4.ern.nps.edu has the rules to drop the invalid packets, spoofed packets, 
XMAS scan packets and NULL scan packets, which are techniques for port scanning. 
 
-A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP 
-A FORWARD -m state --state INVALID -j DROP 
-A OUTPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP 
-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/24 -i eth0 -d 172.20.104.233  -p tcp -
j DROP 
-A INPUT -s 192.168.0.0/24 -i eth0 -d 172.20.104.233  -p 
tcp -j DROP 
-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.0/24 -i eth0 -d 172.20.104.233  -p udp -
j DROP 
-A INPUT -s 192.168.0.0/24 -i eth0 -d 172.20.104.233  -p 
udp -j DROP 
-A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL ALL -j DROP 
-A INPUT -p tcp --tcp-flags ALL NONE -j DROP 
 
We used also DROP policies to define a default rule for packets. 
 
-P INPUT DROP 
-P OUTPUT DROP 
-P FORWARD DROP 
 
For logging dropped packages: 
-A INPUT -m limit --limit 15/minute -j LOG --log-level 4 --




The second firewall, “Second Chance,” has the rules for allowing the traffic 
between the game servers and the database server and drop else. 
 
Rules to accept necessary packets: 
 
-A INPUT -s 10.0.0.1 -i eth0 -d 10.0.0.21  -p TCP --dport 
22 -j ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.21 -o eth0 -d 10.0.0.1  -p tcp --sport 
22 -j ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -s 10.0.0.21 -o eth1 -d 192.168.0.11  -p TCP --
sport 22 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -s 192.168.0.11 -i eth1 -d 10.0.0.21  -p tcp --
dport 22 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -p tcp -m state --state NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -
j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 22 -m state --state 
RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -s 10.0.0.234 -d 192.168.0.11 -p tcp --dport 
27017 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -s 10.0.0.235 -d 192.168.0.11 -p tcp --dport 
27017 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -p icmp -j ACCEPT 
 
 
The rule to log malicious or unnecessary traffic: 
 
-A INPUT -m limit --limit 15/minute -j LOG --log-level 4 --
log-prefix "DROPPED PACKETS_FIRUZ: " 
 
Rules to drop invalid packets: 
 
-A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP 
-A FORWARD -m state --state INVALID -j DROP 
-A OUTPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP 
-P INPUT DROP 
-P OUTPUT DROP 
-P FORWARD DROP 
4. Reverse Proxy Deployment 
As mentioned previously, the reverse proxy is implemented outside of the 
10.0.0.0 network. It is done this way to provide more security by letting game servers 
stay on a subnet other than the reverse proxy.  
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An Apache web server was configured to provide the reverse proxy function. 
When a user types “csfv4.ern.nps.edu” in his browser, our web server directs this request 
to one of the game servers and gathers the data by load balancing the user requests. 
The Apache configuration rules, which reside at /var/httpd/conf/httpd.conf, enable 
the Apache server to transfer the files from game servers to the users and to load balance 





   Order deny,allow 
   Allow from all 
</Proxy> 
#The name of the load balancer is “mycluster “which will 









ProxyPass / http://10.0.0.234:80 
ProxyPass / http://10.0.0.235:80 
ProxyPassReverse / http://10.0.0.234:80 
ProxyPassReverse / http://10.0.0.235:80 
5. IDS Deployment 
As we mentioned earlier, firewall rules will operate at layer 4, inspecting the 
socket pairs. Because we did not use a deep packet inspection firewall to inspect the 
packet traffic at the application level, we should use an IDS device to watch the traffic 
above layer 4. We chose Snort as our network monitoring and IDS solution. 
Snort is an open source tool, which can serve as a sniffer, logger or a network-
based intrusion detection system. There are many organizations around the world that use 
SNORT for intrusion detection. It is also used for protecting the DREN network on the 
NPS campus.  
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Snort has some rule sets as the default. In addition, other necessary packages can 
be installed or user-defined packages can be created (Alder, 2004). We used Snort’s 
predefined packages for the CSFV network. Being deployed both on the 10.0.0.0 subnet 
and 192.168.0.0 subnet, Snort will use a wide range of rule sets to detect malicious 
traffic, some of which are bad data traffic, exploits about mysql, sql injection, web 
attacks, DDoS, flash, chat and browser vulnerabilities. The Snort rules on CSFV network 
include: 
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/bad-traffic.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/chat.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/dos.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/exploit.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/icmp.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/imap.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/misc.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/multimedia.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/netbios.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/nntp.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/p2p.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/smtp.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/snmp.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/specific-threats.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/web-activex.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/web-client.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/web-iis.rules  
# include $SO_RULE_PATH/web-misc.rules 
 
6. Data Encryption 
Data encryption is implemented for the data in motion on the CSFV network. As 
previously stated SSL protocol is used to encrypt the data flowing between the game 
players and the reverse proxy server. Because port 80 would be closed on the firewall of 
csfv4.ern.nps.edu, all data traffic would go through port 443, which is used by HTTPS. 
The data traffic on the CSFV network, however, will be unencrypted going through port 
80. Here, the idea is that if we encrypt the moving data inside the network it needs to be 
decrypted on the reverse proxy server, re-encrypted and served to the clients. If a 
malicious user can get to the reverse proxy server as the man-in-the-middle he can also 
process the data, and the security would be worthless (Kew, 2003). Thus; we use SSL 
encryption between clients and the reverse proxy server. 
 47 
The necessary SSL module (mod_ssl) for the CentOS operating system to encrypt 
the data traffic was downloaded from the CentOS repository (Figure 16). It runs as an 
Apache httpd module dependent. 
 
Figure 16.  The SSL module for CentOS . 
7. System Validation via Penetration Testing Tools 
To test the capability of Snort, we directed some attacks on the 10.0.0.0 subnet. 
The first attack tool we used is Nmap, which is widely used to map networks by scanning 
ports and gathering port information. We scanned the 10.0.0.0 network range with Nmap 
and triggered Snort. 
The second tool we used to test Snort is Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC). This tool 
sends thousands of tcp, udp or http packets to make DDoS attacks on specific IP 
addresses or web sites. It is widely used on Internet to attack targets. 
We used LOIC to perform attacks on the second game server’s (csfv6- 








 SNORT ALERTS 
1 [**] [1:100000160:2] COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP message flooding directed to SIP proxy [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Denial of Service] 
[Priority: 2]  
08/04-04:54:48.095433 10.0.0.235:593 -> 
10.0.0.51:34225 
TCP TTL:64 TOS:0x0 ID:0 IpLen:20 DgmLen:40 DF 
***A*R** Seq: 0x0  Ack: 0xF97CB988  Win: 0x0  TcpLen: 20 
2 [**] [1:100000160:2] COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP message flooding directed to SIP proxy [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Denial of Service] 
[Priority: 2]  
08/04-04:54:48.095960 10.0.0.51:34225 -> 
10.0.0.235:1084 
TCP TTL:55 TOS:0x0 ID:23251 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44 
******S* Seq: 0xF97CB987  Ack: 0x0  Win: 0x400  
TcpLen: 24 
TCP Options (1) => MSS: 1460 
3 [**] [116:59:1] (snort_decoder): Tcp Window Scale Option found with length > 14 [**] 
[Priority: 3]  
08/04-04:54:49.016109 10.0.0.51:60511 -> 10.0.0.235:1 
TCP TTL:52 TOS:0x0 ID:51460 IpLen:20 DgmLen:60 
**U*P**F Seq: 0x6BC901C6  Ack: 0xBAB16756  Win: 0xFFFF  
TcpLen: 40  UrgPtr: 0x0 
TCP Options (5) => WS: 15 NOP MSS: 265 TS: 4294967295 0 
SackOK 
4 [**] [122:1:0] (portscan) TCP Portscan [**] [Priority: 3]  
08/04-04:55:44.906805 10.0.0.51 -> 10.0.0.2 
PROTO:255 TTL:0 TOS:0x0 ID:27082 IpLen:20 DgmLen:160 
DF 
5 [**] [1:100000160:2] COMMUNITY SIP TCP/IP message flooding directed to SIP proxy [**] 
[Classification: Attempted Denial of Service] 
[Priority: 2]  
08/04-04:55:47.361994 10.0.0.51:40883 -> 
10.0.0.21:49157 
TCP TTL:53 TOS:0x0 ID:59640 IpLen:20 DgmLen:44 
******S* Seq: 0x4C1BBD2  Ack: 0x0  Win: 0x400  TcpLen: 
24 
TCP Options (1) => MSS: 1460 
Table 5.   SNORT alerts 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Manual formal software verification is an expensive and time-consuming process. 
The verification of military software is currently performed by highly skilled analysts 
(Dean, 2013). To reduce the high costs of the formal verification, DARPA started a 
Crowd-Sourced Formal Verification (CSFV) program in 2011. The goal of the program 
is to encourage as many people as possible to participate in this verification process by 
embedding some of the verification logics into computer games that are fun to play. 
In this study the CSFV network is designed and implemented according to the 
common security practices, necessary security measures against possible attacks, and 
DISA STIGs to configure network components. After validation and verification steps we 
observe that the system is working well with all its security elements, and it can be 
trusted to deploy on a secure DoD network. We recommend that the DoD install and 
experiment with our CSFV network prototype on its systems. 
The main goal of this thesis study is to design and prototype a secure and robust 
infrastructure for CSFV games. After going through a review of the literature and 
carrying out the design and implementation steps, we conclude that our CSFV system 
prototype provides these key features: 
IP address filtering and NAT: Our CSFV system prototype provides IP address 
and port filtering with its firewall servers. First firewall rules are set to prevent network 
attacks by dropping spoofed, invalid and malicious packets, such as XMAS and NULL 
scan packets. Also the first firewall logs those malicious packets. Furthermore this 
firewall server provides network address translation rules to use a different set of IP 
addresses from those used by the external network. Our second firewall, on the other 
hand, allows communication only between the game servers and the database server. This 
firewall provides a NAT solution as well. 
Network monitoring and intrusion detection: We implemented SNORT as an 
IDS on both 10.0.0.0 and 192.168.0.0 subnets to monitor the network activity. SNORT 
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uses a wide range of rule sets to detect malicious traffic, including sql injection, web 
attacks, DDoS, flash, and browser vulnerabilities. In Chapter IV we tested the network 
security levels with common attack/scan tools. 
Further security for game servers with a reverse proxy server: By deploying a 
reverse proxy server outside the CSFV network, we aimed to avoid direct communication 
between game players and the CSFV game servers. In our CSFV network prototype the 
reverse proxy server hands over the data from the game servers to the game players. In 
this way we tried to reduce the risk of compromise of any game servers. The reverse 
proxy also load balanced the game servers depending on the number of game players.  
Secure data transfer over SSL: All the game data flowing between the reverse 
proxy server and game players are encrypted by the SSL protocol, and they use port 443. 
B. FUTURE WORK AND CONSIDERATIONS 
This section presents further methods of increasing the security levels of the 
CSFV network prototype: 
• Currently game servers on the CSFV network are kept on the same subnet 
for the sake of network performance and simplicity. However, to provide 
even more security, each game server can be placed in separate subnets to 
prevent simultaneous compromise of the game servers. 
• There is a single database to store both game data and user data. A 
separate database can be designated only for user data to create another 
security layer for user privacy. Game data would then stay on a different 
database. 
• Network based attacks can be augmented including social engineering 
attacks and other network penetration tools. 
• Alternative scenarios can be created to isolate game servers from the 




The Necessary Yum Packages to Run CSFV Games: 
 
MAKEDEV.x86_64                          3.24-6.el6                          @base       
abrt.x86_64                             2.0.8-15.el6.centos                 @base       
abrt-addon-kerneloops.x86_64            2.0.8-15.el6.centos                 @base       
abrt-libs.x86_64                        2.0.8-15.el6.centos                 @base       
acl.x86_64                              2.2.49-6.el6                        @base       
alsa-lib.x86_64                         1.0.22-3.el6                        @base       
apr-util.x86_64                         1.3.9-3.el6_0.1                     @base       
audit-libs.x86_64                       2.2-2.el6                           @base       
atk.x86_64                              1.28.0-2.el6                        @base       
autoconf.noarch                         2.63-5.1.el6                        @base       
automake.noarch                         1.11.1-4.el6                        @base       
avahi-libs.x86_64                       0.6.25-12.el6                       @base       
basesystem.noarch                       10.0-4.el6                          @base       
bash.x86_64                             4.1.2-14.el6                        @base       
bc.x86_64                               1.06.95-1.el6                       @base       
binutils.x86_64                         2.20.51.0.2-5.36.el6                @base       
bison.x86_64                            2.4.1-5.el6                         @base       
btparser.x86_64                         0.17-1.el6                          @base       
bzip2.x86_64                            1.0.5-7.el6_0                       @base       
bzip2-libs.x86_64                       1.0.5-7.el6_0                       @base       
ca-certificates.noarch                  2010.63-3.el6_1.5                   @base       
cairo.x86_64                            1.8.8-3.1.el6                       @base       
cdparanoia-libs.x86_64                  10.2-5.1.el6                        @base       
centos-indexhtml.noarch                 6-1.el6.centos                      @base       
centos-release.x86_64                   6-4.el6.centos.10                   @base       
checkpolicy.x86_64                      2.0.22-1.el6                        @base       
chkconfig.x86_64                        1.3.49.3-2.el6                      @base       
cloog-ppl.x86_64                        0.15.7-1.2.el6                      @base       
compat-gcc-34.x86_64                    3.4.6-19.el6                        @base       
compat-gcc-34-g77.x86_64                3.4.6-19.el6                        @base       
compat-libf2c-34.x86_64                 3.4.6-19.el6                        @base       
compat-libstdc++-296.i686               2.96-144.el6                        @base       
compat-readline5.x86_64                 5.2-17.1.el6                        @base       
cpio.x86_64                             2.10-11.el6_3                       @base       
cpp.x86_64                              4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
cracklib.x86_64                         2.8.16-4.el6                        @base       
cracklib-dicts.x86_64                   2.8.16-4.el6                        @base       
createrepo.noarch                       0.9.9-17.el6                        @base       
cronie.x86_64                           1.4.4-7.el6                         @base       
cronie-anacron.x86_64                   1.4.4-7.el6                         @base       
crontabs.noarch                         1.10-33.el6                         @base       
cvs.x86_64                              1.11.23-15.el6                      @base       
cyrus-sasl.x86_64                       2.1.23-13.el6_3.1                   @base       
cyrus-sasl-lib.x86_64                   2.1.23-13.el6_3.1                   @base       
dash.x86_64                             0.5.5.1-4.el6                       @base       
db4.x86_64                              4.7.25-17.el6                       @base       
db4-utils.x86_64                        4.7.25-17.el6                       @base       
dbus.x86_64                             1:1.2.24-7.el6_3                    @base       
dbus-libs.x86_64                        1:1.2.24-7.el6_3                    @base       
dejavu-fonts-common.noarch              2.30-2.el6                          @base       
dejavu-lgc-sans-mono-fonts.noarch       2.30-2.el6                          @base       
dejavu-sans-mono-fonts.noarch           2.30-2.el6                          @base       
deltarpm.x86_64                         3.5-0.5.20090913git.el6             @base       
device-mapper.x86_64                    1.02.77-9.el6                       @base       
device-mapper-event.x86_64              1.02.77-9.el6                       @base       
device-mapper-event-libs.x86_64         1.02.77-9.el6                       @base       
device-mapper-libs.x86_64               1.02.77-9.el6                       @base       
device-mapper-multipath.x86_64          0.4.9-64.el6                        @base       
device-mapper-multipath-libs.x86_64     0.4.9-64.el6                        @base       
device-mapper-persistent-data.x86_64    0.1.4-1.el6                         @base       
dhclient.x86_64                         12:4.1.1-34.P1.el6.centos           @base       
dhcp-common.x86_64                      12:4.1.1-34.P1.el6.centos           @base       
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diffutils.x86_64                        2.8.1-28.el6                        @base       
dmraid.x86_64                           1.0.0.rc16-11.el6                   @base       
dmraid-events.x86_64                    1.0.0.rc16-11.el6                   @base       
dracut.noarch                           004-303.el6                         @base       
dracut-kernel.noarch                    004-303.el6                         @base       
e2fsprogs.x86_64                        1.41.12-14.el6                      @base       
e2fsprogs-libs.x86_64                   1.41.12-14.el6                      @base       
ecj.x86_64                              1:3.4.2-6.el6                       @base       
ed.x86_64                               1.1-3.3.el6                         @base       
elfutils.x86_64                         0.152-1.el6                         @base       
elfutils-libelf.x86_64                  0.152-1.el6                         @base       
elfutils-libs.x86_64                    0.152-1.el6                         @base       
ethtool.x86_64                          2:3.5-1.el6                         @base       
file.x86_64                             5.04-15.el6                         @base       
file-libs.x86_64                        5.04-15.el6                         @base       
filesystem.x86_64                       2.4.30-3.el6                        @base       
findutils.x86_64                        1:4.4.2-6.el6                       @base       
fipscheck.x86_64                        1.2.0-7.el6                         @base       
fipscheck-lib.x86_64                    1.2.0-7.el6                         @base       
flex.x86_64                             2.5.35-8.el6                        @base       
fontconfig.x86_64                       2.8.0-3.el6                         @base       
fontpackages-filesystem.noarch          1.41-1.1.el6                        @base       
foomatic.x86_64                         4.0.4-1.el6_1.1                     @base       
foomatic-db.noarch                      4.0-7.20091126.el6                  @base       
foomatic-db-filesystem.noarch           4.0-7.20091126.el6                  @base       
foomatic-db-ppds.noarch                 4.0-7.20091126.el6                  @base       
gamin.x86_64                            0.1.10-9.el6                        @base       
gawk.x86_64                             3.1.7-10.el6                        @base       
gcc.x86_64                              4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
gcc-c++.x86_64                          4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
gcc-gfortran.x86_64                     4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
gcc-gnat.x86_64                         4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
gcc-java.x86_64                         4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
gcc-objc.x86_64                         4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
gcc-objc++.x86_64                       4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
gdb.x86_64                              7.2-60.el6                          @base       
gdbm.x86_64                             1.8.0-36.el6                        @base       
gettext.x86_64                          0.17-16.el6                         @base       
ghostscript-fonts.noarch                5.50-23.1.el6                       @base       
glib2.x86_64                            2.22.5-7.el6                        @base       
glibc.i686                              2.12-1.107.el6                      @base       
glibc.x86_64                            2.12-1.107.el6                      @base       
glibc-common.x86_64                     2.12-1.107.el6                      @base       
glibc-devel.x86_64                      2.12-1.107.el6                      @base       
glibc-headers.x86_64                    2.12-1.107.el6                      @base       
gnupg2.x86_64                           2.0.14-4.el6                        @base       
gpgme.x86_64                            1.1.8-3.el6                         @base       
gpm-libs.x86_64                         1.20.6-12.el6                       @base       
grep.x86_64                             2.6.3-3.el6                         @base       
groff.x86_64                            1.18.1.4-21.el6                     @base       
grubby.x86_64                           7.0.15-3.el6                        @base       
gstreamer.x86_64                        0.10.29-1.el6                       @base       
gstreamer-plugins-base.x86_64           0.10.29-2.el6                       @base       
gstreamer-tools.x86_64                  0.10.29-1.el6                       @base       
gtk2.x86_64                             2.18.9-12.el6                       @base       
gzip.x86_64                             1.3.12-18.el6                       @base       
hicolor-icon-theme.noarch               0.11-1.1.el6                        @base       
hwdata.noarch                           0.233-7.9.el6                       @base       
info.x86_64                             4.13a-8.el6                         @base       
iproute.x86_64                          2.6.32-23.el6                       @base       
iptables.x86_64                         1.4.7-9.el6                         @base       
iputils.x86_64                          20071127-16.el6                     @base       
iso-codes.noarch                        3.16-2.el6                          @base       
java-1.5.0-gcj.x86_64                   1.5.0.0-29.1.el6                    @base       
java_cup.x86_64                         1:0.10k-5.el6                       @base       
jpackage-utils.noarch                   1.7.5-3.12.el6                      @base       
kbd.x86_64                              1.15-11.el6                         @base       
kbd-misc.noarch                         1.15-11.el6                         @base       
keyutils-libs.x86_64                    1.4-4.el6                           @base       
kpartx.x86_64                           0.4.9-64.el6                        @base       
lcms-libs.x86_64                        1.19-1.el6                          @base       
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less.x86_64                             436-10.el6                          @base       
libICE.x86_64                           1.0.6-1.el6                         @base       
libSM.x86_64                            1.2.1-2.el6                         @base       
libX11.x86_64                           1.5.0-4.el6                         @base       
libX11-common.noarch                    1.5.0-4.el6                         @base       
libXau.x86_64                           1.0.6-4.el6                         @base       
libXcomposite.x86_64                    0.4.3-4.el6                         @base       
libXcursor.x86_64                       1.1.13-2.el6                        @base       
libXdamage.x86_64                       1.1.3-4.el6                         @base       
libXext.x86_64                          1.3.1-2.el6                         @base       
libXfixes.x86_64                        5.0-3.el6                           @base       
libXfont.x86_64                         1.4.5-2.el6                         @base       
libXft.x86_64                           2.3.1-2.el6                         @base       
libXi.x86_64                            1.6.1-3.el6                         @base       
libXinerama.x86_64                      1.1.2-2.el6                         @base       
libXrandr.x86_64                        1.4.0-1.el6                         @base       
libXrender.x86_64                       0.9.7-2.el6                         @base       
libXt.x86_64                            1.1.3-1.el6                         @base       
libXtst.x86_64                          1.2.1-2.el6                         @base       
libXv.x86_64                            1.0.7-2.el6                         @base       
libXxf86vm.x86_64                       1.1.2-2.el6                         @base       
libacl.x86_64                           2.2.49-6.el6                        @base       
libaio.x86_64                           0.3.107-10.el6                      @base       
libart_lgpl.x86_64                      2.3.20-5.1.el6                      @base       
libattr.x86_64                          2.4.44-7.el6                        @base       
libcap.x86_64                           2.16-5.5.el6                        @base       
libcap-ng.x86_64                        0.6.4-3.el6_0.1                     @base       
libcom_err.x86_64                       1.41.12-14.el6                      @base       
libdrm.x86_64                           2.4.39-1.el6                        @base       
libedit.x86_64                          2.11-4.20080712cvs.1.el6            @base       
libevent.x86_64                         1.4.13-4.el6                        @base       
libffi.x86_64                           3.0.5-3.2.el6                       @base       
libfontenc.x86_64                       1.0.5-2.el6                         @base       
libgcc.i686                             4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgcc.x86_64                           4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgcj.x86_64                           4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgcj-devel.x86_64                     4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgfortran.x86_64                      4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgnat.x86_64                          4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgnat-devel.x86_64                    4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgomp.x86_64                          4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libgpg-error.x86_64                     1.7-4.el6                           @base       
libgudev1.x86_64                        147-2.46.el6                        @base       
libidn.x86_64                           1.18-2.el6                          @base       
libjpeg-turbo.x86_64                    1.2.1-1.el6                         @base       
libmng.x86_64                           1.0.10-4.1.el6                      @base       
libnih.x86_64                           1.0.1-7.el6                         @base       
libobjc.x86_64                          4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libogg.x86_64                           2:1.1.4-2.1.el6                     @base       
liboil.x86_64                           0.3.16-4.1.el6                      @base       
libpciaccess.x86_64                     0.13.1-2.el6                        @base       
libreport.x86_64                        2.0.9-15.el6.centos                 @base       
libreport-compat.x86_64                 2.0.9-15.el6.centos                 @base       
libreport-plugin-kerneloops.x86_64      2.0.9-15.el6.centos                 @base       
libreport-plugin-reportuploader.x86_64  2.0.9-15.el6.centos                 @base       
libreport-plugin-rhtsupport.x86_64      2.0.9-15.el6.centos                 @base       
libreport-python.x86_64                 2.0.9-15.el6.centos                 @base       
libselinux.x86_64                       2.0.94-5.3.el6                      @base       
libselinux-utils.x86_64                 2.0.94-5.3.el6                      @base       
libsemanage.x86_64                      2.0.43-4.2.el6                      @base       
libsepol.x86_64                         2.0.41-4.el6                        @base       
libss.x86_64                            1.41.12-14.el6                      @base       
libssh2.x86_64                          1.4.2-1.el6                         @base       
libstdc++.x86_64                        4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libstdc++-devel.x86_64                  4.4.7-3.el6                         @base       
libsysfs.x86_64                         2.1.0-7.el6                         @base       
libtar.x86_64                           1.2.11-17.el6                       @base       
libthai.x86_64                          0.1.12-3.el6                        @base       
libtheora.x86_64                        1:1.1.0-2.el6                       @base       
libtiff.x86_64                          3.9.4-9.el6_3                       @base       
libtool.x86_64                          2.2.6-15.5.el6                      @base       
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libudev.x86_64                          147-2.46.el6                        @base       
libusb.x86_64                           0.1.12-23.el6                       @base       
libuser.x86_64                          0.56.13-5.el6                       @base       
libutempter.x86_64                      1.1.5-4.1.el6                       @base       
libvisual.x86_64                        0.4.0-9.1.el6                       @base       
libxcb.x86_64                           1.8.1-1.el6                         @base       
libxslt.x86_64                          1.1.26-2.el6_3.1                    @base       
logrotate.x86_64                        3.7.8-16.el6                        @base       
lua.x86_64                              5.1.4-4.1.el6                       @base       
lvm2.x86_64                             2.02.98-9.el6                       @base       
lvm2-libs.x86_64                        2.02.98-9.el6                       @base       
lynx.x86_64                             2.8.6-27.el6                        @base       
m2crypto.x86_64                         0.20.2-9.el6                        @base       
m4.x86_64                               1.4.13-5.el6                        @base       
mailcap.noarch                          2.1.31-2.el6                        @base       
mailx.x86_64                            12.4-6.el6                          @base       
make.x86_64                             1:3.81-20.el6                       @base       
man.x86_64                              1.6f-32.el6                         @base       
mcstrans.x86_64                         0.3.1-4.el6                         @base       
memcached.x86_64                        1.4.4-3.el6                         @base       
mercurial.x86_64                        1.4-3.el6                           @base       
mesa-dri-drivers.x86_64                 9.0-0.7.el6                         @base       
mesa-dri-filesystem.x86_64              9.0-0.7.el6                         @base       
mesa-dri1-drivers.x86_64                7.11-8.el6                          @base       
mesa-libGL.x86_64                       9.0-0.7.el6                         @base       
mesa-libGLU.x86_64                      9.0-0.7.el6                         @base       
mingetty.x86_64                         1.08-5.el6                          @base       
mlocate.x86_64                          0.22.2-4.el6                        @base       
module-init-tools.x86_64                3.9-21.el6                          @base       
mpfr.x86_64                             2.4.1-6.el6                         @base       
mutt.x86_64                             5:1.5.20-2.20091214hg736b6a.el6_1.1 @base       
nano.x86_64                             2.0.9-7.el6                         @base       
ncurses.x86_64                          5.7-3.20090208.el6                  @base       
ncurses-base.x86_64                     5.7-3.20090208.el6                  @base       
ncurses-libs.x86_64                     5.7-3.20090208.el6                  @base       
neon.x86_64                             0.29.3-2.el6                        @base       
nspr.x86_64                             4.9.2-1.el6                         @base       
nss.x86_64                              3.14.0.0-12.el6                     @base       
nss-softokn.x86_64                      3.12.9-11.el6                       @base       
nss-softokn-freebl.i686                 3.12.9-11.el6                       @base       
nss-softokn-freebl.x86_64               3.12.9-11.el6                       @base       
nss-sysinit.x86_64                      3.14.0.0-12.el6                     @base       
nss-tools.x86_64                        3.14.0.0-12.el6                     @base       
nss-util.x86_64                         3.14.0.0-2.el6                      @base       
nss_compat_ossl.x86_64                  0.9.6-1.el6                         @base       
openjpeg-libs.x86_64                    1.3-9.el6_3                         @base       
openssh.x86_64                          5.3p1-84.1.el6                      @base       
openssh-askpass.x86_64                  5.3p1-84.1.el6                      @base       
openssh-clients.x86_64                  5.3p1-84.1.el6                      @base       
openssh-server.x86_64                   5.3p1-84.1.el6                      @base       
pakchois.x86_64                         0.4-3.2.el6                         @base       
pam.x86_64                              1.1.1-13.el6                        @base       
pango.x86_64                            1.28.1-7.el6_3                      @base       
patch.x86_64                            2.6-6.el6                           @base       
pax.x86_64                              3.4-10.1.el6                        @base       
pcre.x86_64                             7.8-6.el6                           @base       
perl-Error.noarch                       1:0.17015-4.el6                     @base       
perl-URI.noarch                         1.40-2.el6                          @base       
pinentry.x86_64                         0.7.6-6.el6                         @base       
pkgconfig.x86_64                        1:0.23-9.1.el6                      @base       
plymouth.x86_64                         0.8.3-27.el6.centos                 @base       
plymouth-core-libs.x86_64               0.8.3-27.el6.centos                 @base       
plymouth-scripts.x86_64                 0.8.3-27.el6.centos                 @base       
policycoreutils.x86_64                  2.0.83-19.30.el6                    @base       
poppler.x86_64                          0.12.4-3.el6_0.1                    @base       
poppler-data.noarch                     0.4.0-1.el6                         @base       
poppler-utils.x86_64                    0.12.4-3.el6_0.1                    @base       
popt.x86_64                             1.13-7.el6                          @base       
portreserve.x86_64                      0.0.4-9.el6                         @base       
postfix.x86_64                          2:2.6.6-2.2.el6_1                   @base       
ppl.x86_64                              0.10.2-11.el6                       @base       
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procps.x86_64                           3.2.8-25.el6                        @base       
psmisc.x86_64                           22.6-15.el6_0.1                     @base       
pth.x86_64                              2.0.7-9.3.el6                       @base       
pygpgme.x86_64                          0.1-18.20090824bzr68.el6            @base       
python.x86_64                           2.6.6-36.el6                        @base       
python-deltarpm.x86_64                  3.5-0.5.20090913git.el6             @base       
python-iniparse.noarch                  0.3.1-2.1.el6                       @base       
python-libs.x86_64                      2.6.6-36.el6                        @base       
python-pycurl.x86_64                    7.19.0-8.el6                        @base       
python-urlgrabber.noarch                3.9.1-8.el6                         @base       
qt3.x86_64                              3.3.8b-30.el6                       @base       
readline.x86_64                         6.0-4.el6                           @base       
redhat-logos.noarch                     60.0.14-12.el6.centos               @base       
redhat-lsb.x86_64                       4.0-7.el6.centos                    @base       
redhat-lsb-compat.x86_64                4.0-7.el6.centos                    @base       
redhat-lsb-core.x86_64                  4.0-7.el6.centos                    @base       
redhat-lsb-graphics.x86_64              4.0-7.el6.centos                    @base       
redhat-lsb-printing.x86_64              4.0-7.el6.centos                    @base       
redhat-rpm-config.noarch                9.0.3-42.el6                        @base       
rootfiles.noarch                        8.1-6.1.el6                         @base       
rpm.x86_64                              4.8.0-32.el6                        @base       
rpm-build.x86_64                        4.8.0-32.el6                        @base       
rpm-libs.x86_64                         4.8.0-32.el6                        @base       
rpm-python.x86_64                       4.8.0-32.el6                        @base       
rrdtool.x86_64                          1.3.8-6.el6                         @base       
rrdtool-devel.x86_64                    1.3.8-6.el6                         @base       
rrdtool-doc.x86_64                      1.3.8-6.el6                         @base       
rrdtool-perl.x86_64                     1.3.8-6.el6                         @base       
rrdtool-python.x86_64                   1.3.8-6.el6                         @base       
rrdtool-ruby.x86_64                     1.3.8-6.el6                         @base       
rrdtool-tcl.x86_64                      1.3.8-6.el6                         @base       
rsync.x86_64                            3.0.6-9.el6                         @base       
rsyslog.x86_64                          5.8.10-6.el6                        @base       
rubygems.noarch                         1.3.7-1.el6                         @base       
screen.x86_64                           4.0.3-16.el6                        @base       
sed.x86_64                              4.2.1-10.el6                        @base       
setup.noarch                            2.8.14-20.el6                       @base       
sgpio.x86_64                            1.2.0.10-5.el6                      @base       
shadow-utils.x86_64                     2:4.1.4.2-13.el6                    @base       
sinjdoc.x86_64                          0.5-9.1.el6                         @base       
sqlite.x86_64                           3.6.20-1.el6                        @base       
sudo.x86_64                             1.8.6p3-7.el6                       @base       
sysfsutils.x86_64                       2.1.0-7.el6                         @base       
sysstat.x86_64                          9.0.4-20.el6                        @base       
sysvinit-tools.x86_64                   2.87-4.dsf.el6                      @base       
tar.x86_64                              2:1.23-11.el6                       @base       
tcl.x86_64                              1:8.5.7-6.el6                       @base       
tcp_wrappers-libs.x86_64                7.6-57.el6                          @base       
time.x86_64                             1.7-37.1.el6                        @base       
tk.x86_64                               1:8.5.7-5.el6                       @base       
tmpwatch.x86_64                         2.9.16-4.el6                        @base       
tokyocabinet.x86_64                     1.4.33-6.el6                        @base       
udev.x86_64                             147-2.46.el6                        @base       
unzip.x86_64                            6.0-1.el6                           @base       
upstart.x86_64                          0.6.5-12.el6                        @base       
urlview.x86_64                          0.9-7.el6                           @base       
urw-fonts.noarch                        2.4-10.el6                          @base       
usermode.x86_64                         1.102-3.el6                         @base       
ustr.x86_64                             1.0.4-9.1.el6                       @base       
vim-common.x86_64                       2:7.2.411-1.8.el6                   @base       
vim-enhanced.x86_64                     2:7.2.411-1.8.el6                   @base       
vim-minimal.x86_64                      2:7.2.411-1.8.el6                   @base       
wget.x86_64                             1.12-1.8.el6                        @base       
which.x86_64                            2.19-6.el6                          @base       
xml-common.noarch                       0.6.3-32.el6                        @base       
xmlrpc-c.x86_64                         1.16.24-1209.1840.el6               @base       
xmlrpc-c-client.x86_64                  1.16.24-1209.1840.el6               @base       
xorg-x11-font-utils.x86_64              1:7.2-11.el6                        @base       
xz.x86_64                               4.999.9-0.3.beta.20091007git.el6    @base       
xz-libs.x86_64                          4.999.9-0.3.beta.20091007git.el6    @base       
xz-lzma-compat.x86_64                   4.999.9-0.3.beta.20091007git.el6    @base       
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yajl.x86_64                             1.0.7-3.el6                         @base       
yum.noarch                              3.2.29-40.el6.centos                @base       
yum-metadata-parser.x86_64              1.1.2-16.el6                        @base       
yum-plugin-fastestmirror.noarch         1.1.30-14.el6                       @base       
yum-utils.noarch                        1.1.30-14.el6                       @base       
zip.x86_64                              3.0-1.el6                           @base       
zlib.x86_64                             1.2.3-29.el6                        @base       
zlib-devel.x86_64                       1.2.3-29.el6                        @base   
apr.x86_64                              1.3.9-5.el6_2                       @updates    
at.x86_64                               3.1.10-43.el6_2.1                   @updates    
bind-libs.x86_64                        32:9.8.2-0.17.rc1.el6_4.4           @updates    
bind-utils.x86_64                       32:9.8.2-0.17.rc1.el6_4.4           @updates    
coreutils.x86_64                        8.4-19.el6_4.1                      @updates    
coreutils-libs.x86_64                   8.4-19.el6_4.1                      @updates    
cups.x86_64                             1:1.4.2-50.el6_4.4                  @updates    
cups-libs.x86_64                        1:1.4.2-50.el6_4.4                  @updates    
curl.x86_64                             7.19.7-36.el6_4                     @updates    
dbus-glib.x86_64                        0.86-6.el6                          @updates    
elinks.x86_64                           0.12-0.21.pre5.el6_3                @updates    
expat.x86_64                            2.0.1-11.el6_2                      @updates    
freetype.x86_64                         2.3.11-14.el6_3.1                   @updates    
ghostscript.x86_64                      8.70-15.el6_4.1                     @updates    
git.x86_64                              1.7.1-3.el6_4.1                     @updates    
gmp.x86_64                              4.3.1-7.el6_2.2                     @updates    
gnutls.x86_64                           2.8.5-10.el6_4.1                    @updates    
initscripts.x86_64                      9.03.38-1.el6.centos.1              @updates    
jasper-libs.x86_64                      1.900.1-15.el6_1.1                  @updates    
krb5-libs.x86_64                        1.10.3-10.el6_4.2                   @updates    
ksh.x86_64                              20100621-19.el6_4.3                 @updates    
libblkid.x86_64                         2.17.2-12.9.el6_4.3                 @updates    
libcurl.x86_64                          7.19.7-36.el6_4                     @updates    
libgcrypt.x86_64                        1.4.5-9.el6_2.2                     @updates    
libpng.x86_64                           2:1.2.49-1.el6_2                    @updates    
libproxy.x86_64                         0.3.0-4.el6_3                       @updates    
libproxy-bin.x86_64                     0.3.0-4.el6_3                       @updates    
libproxy-python.x86_64                  0.3.0-4.el6_3                       @updates    
libtasn1.x86_64                         2.3-3.el6_2.1                       @updates    
libuuid.x86_64                          2.17.2-12.9.el6_4.3                 @updates    
libvorbis.x86_64                        1:1.2.3-4.el6_2.1                   @updates    
libxml2.x86_64                          2.7.6-12.el6_4.1                    @updates    
libxml2-python.x86_64                   2.7.6-12.el6_4.1                    @updates    
mysql-libs.x86_64                       5.1.69-1.el6_4                      @updates    
net-tools.x86_64                        1.60-110.el6_2                      @updates    
openldap.x86_64                         2.4.23-32.el6_4.1                   @updates    
openssl.x86_64                          1.0.0-27.el6_4.2                    @updates    
passwd.x86_64                           0.77-4.el6_2.2                      @updates    
perl.x86_64                             4:5.10.1-131.el6_4                  @updates    
perl-CGI.x86_64                         3.51-131.el6_4                      @updates    
perl-ExtUtils-MakeMaker.x86_64          6.55-131.el6_4                      @updates    
perl-ExtUtils-ParseXS.x86_64            1:2.2003.0-131.el6_4                @updates    
perl-Git.noarch                         1.7.1-3.el6_4.1                     @updates    
perl-Module-Pluggable.x86_64            1:3.90-131.el6_4                    @updates    
perl-Pod-Escapes.x86_64                 1:1.04-131.el6_4                    @updates    
perl-Pod-Simple.x86_64                  1:3.13-131.el6_4                    @updates    
perl-Test-Harness.x86_64                3.17-131.el6_4                      @updates    
perl-Test-Simple.x86_64                 0.92-131.el6_4                      @updates    
perl-devel.x86_64                       4:5.10.1-131.el6_4                  @updates    
perl-libs.x86_64                        4:5.10.1-131.el6_4                  @updates    
perl-version.x86_64                     3:0.77-131.el6_4                    @updates    
phonon-backend-gstreamer.x86_64         1:4.6.2-26.el6_4                    @updates    
pixman.x86_64                           0.26.2-5.el6_4                      @updates    
qt.x86_64                               1:4.6.2-26.el6_4                    @updates    
qt-sqlite.x86_64                        1:4.6.2-26.el6_4                    @updates    
qt-x11.x86_64                           1:4.6.2-26.el6_4                    @updates    
rightscale.x86_64                       5.7.14-1                            installed   
ruby.x86_64                             1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
ruby-devel.x86_64                       1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
ruby-docs.x86_64                        1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
ruby-irb.x86_64                         1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
ruby-libs.x86_64                        1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
ruby-rdoc.x86_64                        1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
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ruby-ri.x86_64                          1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
ruby-tcltk.x86_64                       1.8.7.352-10.el6_4                  @updates    
subversion.x86_64                       1.6.11-9.el6_4                      @updates    
tzdata.noarch                           2013b-1.el6                         @updates    
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